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When you first arnve as a member of the 
Multinational Brigade North (MNB(N)), you 
are fu ll of promise. You know your team of 
highly trained professional soldiers will make a 
difference in the lives of those that live in BiH. 
Then it sets in. Your six-month tour of duty 
doesn't allow you ti me to finish what you 
starr. So what is ir you can do to make a dif-
fe rence in only six months? T his is the exact 
question rhar starred rhe process of developing 
rhe U.S. Army National Guard Demining 
Initiative in BiH. This initiative was under-
taken by the U.S. Army's National Guard, an 
adjunct to rhe U.S. Armed Forces. There are 
multitudes of issues you can work ro resolve in 
Boznia-Herzegovina (BiH). MNB(N) plays a 
supporting role in most of these, bur we want-
ed ro do something more. We wanted to bring 
a fresh idea to the area of operation (AO ) rhar 
would make a significant impact on one of the 
many critical issues facing BiH. To make our 
choice, we focused on two key concerns: 
"What will have the biggest impact on rhe 
daily lives of rhe people?" and "What will 
instill confidence in the international commu-
nity ro speed up economic recovery?" We 
chose the issue of demining. 
Relhinkinu How We Do Demining 
II 
So why choose demining? As a mil-
itary officer, I have always been told to stare 
rhe bottom li ne up front no matter how bad 
the situation. So here it is: seven years after 
Dayton, progress in clearing mines in BiH is 
far from what is required to create a safe and 
secure environment. Containment (marking/ 
fencing) efforts are almost non-existent. 
The mine threat in BiH is wide-
spread, of low density and dispersed.The 
IEBL is rhe dividing line between the entity 
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armed forces at the end of hostilities as defined 
by the Dayton Peace Accord (GFAP). This 
heavily mined area is probably the single most 
important factor affecting our continued sup-
port of two key military tasks. 
I ,,, 
The first key military task affected 
is our ability to "provide a safe and secure 
environment" in BiH. So far in 2003, mine 
strikes have caused 13 deaths and five serious 
injuries1 1n the MNB(N) Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) alone. More than 2, 100 
sq km ofBiH requires a "Technical Survey" to 
determine if rhe area is mined.2 Technical 
evaluations have estimated rhar 400 sq km to 
1,000 sq km of this suspect area will require 
"Clearance Operations" of some sorr3 that 
include mechanical and manual clearing tech-
niques. The key pro perry of these operations is 
they must meer humanitarian demining stan-
dards if we are to provide a permanent solu-
tion for a safe and secure environment. 
H old on a minute. Military reams 
don't perform humanitarian demining. So 
why are we focusing on this issue? Mainly 
because we have to. In the modern world of 
the coalition forces, rhe military is nor always 
provided with defined limits for tasks that 
their forces must effectively perfo rm to meet 
coalition objectives. This is especially true in 
rhe world of Stabilization and Securi ty 
Operations (SASO) like the tasks we are cur-
rently performing in BiH and will soon per-
fo rm in Iraq. 
As we have seen in recent headlines, 
our military leaders are also realizing this 
truth. As you read this article, military leaders 
are working to implement these new prio rities 
before they become roadblocks to security 
around the world. If we are to be successful in 
rhis transitional process, we must be active ar 
all levels of expertise. While mili tary leaders 
are focused on changing policies that address 
our demining limits, we ar the tactical level 
must be ready to respond with a well-devel-
oped plan of action to meet these new SASO 
priorities. T he plan we are proposing is the 
first step in meeting one of rhese new priori-
ties. Our pro posal combines the cri tical 
strengths of solid leadership and unified com-
mand rhat military organizations possess with 
Humanitarian Demining 
tor coalition forces > 
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rhe technological advantages of a modern, 
well-equipped humanitarian demining ream. 
Such military organizations are something the 
U.S. Army National Guard is uniquely suired 
for. The U.S. Army National Guard in itself is 
an exceptional organization known worldwide 
for irs ability to quickly adapt to the ever-
changing req uirements of international securi-
ty environs. Our success in managing dynam-
ic peacekeeping operations is well-known. 
T he U.S. Army National Guard is 
currently involved in the New Horizons exer-
cises that focus on developing emerging doc-
tri ne and operational skills for humanitarian 
and civil assistance missions. These mandates, 
combined with our operational experience in 
peacekeeping operations, will rhrusr the U.S. 
Army National Guard into rhe forefront of 
modern humanitarian doctrinal development. 
This is why I say we must perform this mis-
sion of thinking outside the military norms of 
yesterday. 
"' n 
The second key military rask affect-
ed by the BiH mine risk is our abili ty to 
"maima
in 
freedom of movement." Freedom 
of movement is a key ingredient in eliminat-
ing threats to economic development and to 
allow displaced persons and refugees (DPRE ) 
to return. Bur today's slow and inconsistent 
demining processes are unable to meer the 
demands of rhese humanitarian missions. 
Over the past few years, the average clearance 
rate of all demining operations in BiH is six sq 
km per year. That's about 1.5 percent of rhe 
suspecred area of risk. The cost to dare for all 
demining in BiH is $100 million (U.S.) or an 
average of $ 16.6 million per year. To accom-
plish even this minimal level of success 
involves the work of the Armed Forces in BiH 
(AF BiH) demining teams and the efforts of 
42 non-governmental organizations (NGOs)/ 
commercial activities that arc accredited to 
demine by rhe Bosnia-Herzegovina M ine 
Action Center (BHMAC) . These NGOs and 
commercial activities provide most of the 
mechanical supporr (flails and vegetation cut-
ters) required bur ar a premium cost. The AF 
BiH demining reams have far less equipment 
bur they have the most experienced and well-
trai ned deminers available; plus their hearts 
are in it. Of this six sq km total per year, the 
International T rust Fund for Demining (ITF) 
srated that NGOs and commercial acriviries 
completed 2.3 sq km in 2002.4 Based on this 
finding, the AF BiH dcminers appear ro per-
form rhe bulk of rhe demining efforts with the 
least amount of equipment and personnel. 
Let us nor forger the International 
Community (IC) is also watching. Based on 
various inputs from gro ups such as rhe 
Organization for Security Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and other key diplomatic 
agencies, the IC goal for demining success in 
BiH was derermined to be 12 sq km per yea r.5 
The IC feels this level of reduction is a key 
indicator for the economic growth of BiH and 
is one of the "confidence" barometers they use 
to judge rhe ability ofBiH to create rhe secure 
and stable environment that is paramount for 
joining the European Union (EU). This con-
fidence level equates to investment opportuni-
ty and faster economic recove1y for BiH. So 
here's some more bad news. Based on the suc-
cess of the current demining approacl1 in BiH , 
it will rake 60 to 200 years to demine BiH. 
The United Narions Development Program 
(UND
P) 
esrimares the funding required to 
accomplish this demining at $26 million per 
year.6 It is easy to see we lack the funds, we 
lack rhe rime and we lack the patience to sac-
rifice the life of another innocent human due 
to our inability to change an outdated military 
paradigm. 
\\,., 
The question for our team now is 
"What do we change?" I LT Richard Weber, 
Officer in C harge (OIC) of the SFOR 12 
Mine Cell , completed the initial concept for a 
Demining Brigade in early 2003. The original 
concept was to develop a Demining Brigade 
that could meet BiH domestic mandates as 
well as other international mandates. I L T 
Weber's unique design integrated rhe 
strengths of a military organization with the 
technological advantages of a modern human-
itarian demini ng team. T here have been vari-
ous equivalents of lesser size (i.e., Berlin Wall 
ream, ere.) bur never before has there been 
such a forceful effort to make humanitarian 
dcmining a permanent milirary mission. 
Before handing over the reins to SFOR 13, 
1 L T Weber developed a well-thought-our 
technical design fo r the brigade that became 
rhe basis fo r rhe T able of Organization and 
Equipment (TOE ) used in our current design. 
Based on this in itial design, SFOR 13 was 
ready to move the concept to rhe next level by 
build ing mili tary and diplomatic support for 
rhe initiative 
Time to Take It Up a Nolch 
J ll 
To build this support, we needed to 
show why this humanitarian demining ream 
would be successful where others fa iled . So 
what are the failings the initiative needed ro 
answer' While some of rhe lack of success may 
be attributed to rhc nature of rhe mine threat, 
much is due to inefficiency, mismanagement 
and the appearance of corruption in rhe 
bureaucracy. To answer rhese concerns, we 
concentrated on four critical areas of focus. 
1. An integrated demining effort 
is required: First was the need for a demi-
ning operation that is integrated from the 
state level down to the individual deminer. 
The current method of demining does not 
adequately integrate demining operations 
and wastes valuable time and resources. 
Military clearance procedures, although 
weH integrated and fast in nature, do not 
provide the 99.6 percent clearance level 
mandated by International Humanitarian 
standards in SASO environments. Our ini-
tiative must integrate mechanical means, 
manual demining efforts, Explosive 
Detecting Dog Teams (EDDTs) and con-
tainment practices. Although we use these 
four methods today, they are not integrated 
at the level required to be consistently effec-
tive. NGOs, commercial activities, and AF 
BiH are all used to perform these tasks in a 
fractional manner due to competing agen-
das and interests. 
2. The BHMAC and government 
control: The BiH Demining Law of 
February 2002 set standards for BiH demi-
ning in line with international protocols. 
This law is crucial leverage for the success 
of demining in BiH and must be fully sup-
ported by our proposal. This law allows the 
BiH government to endorse the BHMAC 
by providing two key mandates: 
• T he BH MAC is rhe sole national 
authority for rhc coordination of mine clear-
ance . 
• The BHMAC is the only 
inst itution responsible fo r nationa l 
standards and quality assurance. 
Since the formation of the 
BHMAC and the reorganization of its 
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regional offices, some institutional coher-
ence has been achieved. However, many 
national interests continue to prevail in the 
decision cycle for prioritization and 
resources allocation. By providing the 
BHMAC with the operational tools neces-
sary to double its success rate, its ability to 
manage relevant national interests will be 
substantially reinforced. 
3 . Donor Fatigue: The general 
decline of world economies has caused 
international charitable aid and donor gov-
ernment funds to decline from previous 
years' contributions. One such example is a 
substantial donor to BiH demining efforts, 
the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA). For 2003-2008, their 
funding is reduced to $750 miJiion as com-
pared to $1.0 billion over the previous five-
year period. Aggravating this lack of funds 
is the lack of progress toward BiH unifica-
tion. This is affecting donor focus on BiH 
and is allowing other more successful coun-
tries to take funding precedence. These IC 
donations are usually funneled through 
two main support areas: NGOs and the 
ITF. 
• NGO Aspects: NGOs provide 
exposure and financial conduits fo r interna-
tional inslitlltions and donors. Some NGOs 
provide only management services and some 
only provide mine-clearing resources, wh ile 
ochers even undertake demining operation; as 
quasi-commercial activities. However, com-
mercial activities rend to bid on rhe "easier" 
jobs as profit and risk factors limit their invest-
ment in the fu ll range of equipment available. 
NGOs arc also usually the first ro attract inter-
national donors, as donors don't pay directly 
ro governments due to suspicion of corrup-
tion. Bear in mind that with the exception of 
canine counrermining , NGOs arc nor critical 
to BiH d emining based on activities to dare. 
• The lTF and Commercial 
Aspects: Commercial dcmining is paid for by 
inrcrnario nal donors and rh us comperes with 
NCO and AF BiH dcmining dforrs for fund-
ing. Commercial dcmining reams also suffer 
from rhe stigma of corruption th roughout 
BiH. This corruption mani fests itself in many 
w,1ys and casts suspicion on rhc BHMAC and 
the ITF. The ITF is rhe major funding tool for 
commncial demining in BiH. Bur these funds 
arc waning also. In an arridc on the !Tf web-
sire, Mr. Ccm persek, ITF Director, scared, 
"There arc a lot of changes in rhc donors' deci-
sions as ro where they want to place their 
money, we are afraid thar rhe donations will 
go down and nor up."7 We wish to main tain 
our relationship with the ITF but reduce our 
dependence on NGOs and commercial opera-
nons. 
4. AF BiH Aspects: Here's the 
bottom line for the AF BiH: The 
Instructions to Parties (ITP) obligates the 
AF BiH to demine and they are also obli-
gated to sustain this capability. AF BiH 
deminers are capable manual deminers but 
lack consistent funding. The BiH govern-
ment is providing most of the administra-
tive costs, but this support may not survive 
the AF BiH restructuring now underway. 
The reality is that since Dayton, AF BiH 
demining has been largely sustained by 
donated capital and equipment. Donations 
have also maintained this equipment, 
bought consumables, and purchased acci-
dent insurance that is required on the dem-
ining laws. While factional interests some-
times still prevail, at the grassroots level, AF 
BiH soldiers wish to maintain their demi-
ning momentum. A commitment to demi-
ning is not so obvious at the senior level of 
the AF BiH command. AF BiH command-
ers view demining as a drain on the already 
austere defense budget and do not support 
incorporating the current 470 deminers 
into the new force structure. If we are to be 
successful, we must integrate demining 
units into the proposed 12,000 soldier-
restructuring plan and maintain a minimal 
force for combat engineers (mobility/coun-
termobility) . What the AF BiH 
Commanders fail to understand is that the 
IC sees their current demining components 
as the only element of the AF BiH produc-
ing a positive contribution to BiH unifica-
tion. As the AF BiH restructure to join 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), BiH demining 
expertise is seen as the specialized contribu-
tion the AF BiH can make as a potential 
member of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). In this sense, our 
demining initiative has global implications. 
Although it was a bold d esign, the 
im plications of funding challenges, the chang-
ing nature of rhe AF BiH restructuring, and 
rhe IC's red uced commitment to BiH demi-
ning demanded char we make changes ro 1 L T 
Weber's initial design. After review of th e 
design by the MNB(N) Commander, rhe 
Stabilization Force (SFOR ) Comm-ander and 
staff, the U.S. Ambassador to BiH, the OSCE, 
the Office of the High Representative (OHR), 
and other members of the IC, we modified the 
in itiative ro meet rhc new sociopolitical 
dynamics. CPT Kyle Shaff e r, OIC of the 
SFOR 13 M ine Cell, assisted by MAJ Tom 
Barnett, SFOR 13 J oint Military Affai rs 
Liaison Officer to SFOR and IC, answered 
the challenges posed by these forward looking 
diplomatic and military leaders. The design 
now focused on creating a more flexible mili-
raty demining unit with a humanitarian mis-
sion at the state level of BiH char can be 
phased in based on national and international 
mandates. The design focused on several key 
objectives thar musr be supported. 
Specifically, rhe design must: 
• Provide significant performance 
improvements for AF BiH demining rates 
• Be supported by a sustained, ade-
quate and regular funding arrangemen t 
• Be integra red into the ongoi ng AF 
restructuring etforrs 
• Concentrate responsibili ty and 
capabili ties under one management organiza-
tion 
• Create a single organization with 
domesric and in ternational mandates 
• Be support ed by a legitimate 
NATO/EU supervisory ream 
Our Proposal for Militarv Demininu 
Team with a Humanitarian Mission 
The design we are proposing con-
centrates responsibility and capabilities under 
one management organization. This will allow 
the unit to immediately address any priorities 
designated by the BHMAC regardless of loca-
tion or size. The design creates a single organ-
ization with domestic and international man-
dares. Once fielded and proven in BiH, rhis 
design can be emulated in any of rhe 60 other 
nations requiring humanitarian demining. 
This will p rovide NATO and rhe world with 
a capabili ty rhar has never before been seen in 
military organizations, but that will soon be 
mandated by rhe changing face of military sta-
bil ization operations. T h rough the use of 
NATO/EU supervision, the proposed unit 
will reinforce rhe legitimacy of the BiH demi-
ning effort, which will in turn attract sus-
rained IC funding for state-of-the-an equip-
ment and training. This influx of equipment 
alone will enable the unit to realize significant 
performance improvements for AF BiH dem-
ining operations. Our proposed demining 
unit improves the security and long term sta-
bili ty of BiH by accelerati ng rhe removal of 
the de facto BiH "Berlin Wall." It also 
enhances the AF BiH restructuring plan, 
enhances BiH prospects for PfP cooperation, 
and provides a highly capable team for rhc 
implementation of humanitarian dem ining in 
NATO stabil ization operations. This demi-
ning initiative is an investmenr in a focused 
solution to the BiH mine problem as well as 
having implications ro meet global mine 
rhrcars. T h is fact alone will make our propos-
al a key contributor to the U.S . Demining 
2010 Initiative char aspires to clear the world 
of mines by 2010. The key is rhe simpl icity of 
rhe basic units and the flexibility that they 
provide. So what will the demining units look 
like? 
Based on the key objectives above, 
the demining initiative we arc p roposing is 
fo rmed from nvo key structures. These base 
structures are a Heavy Humanitarian Demin-
ing Company and a Light Humanitarian 
Demining Company. 
The H eavy Humanitarian 
Demining Company (HDC(H)) provides a 
combination of manual deminers, EDDTs, 
and mechanical clearing equipmenr to answer 
the needs of complex terrain minefields. This 
company p rovides additio nal mech anical 
assets rhar are currenrly nor parr of AF BiH 
demining reams. The new combination of 
mechanical assets will allow the HDC(H) to 
clear more congested terrain at smaller levels. 
Should heavier equipment be required, rhe 
battalion headquarters is equipped ro handle 
this need. The HDC(H) provides more readi-
ly available mechanical assets throughout BiH 
without the current dependence on commer-
cial activities. T his will allow rhe HDC(H) ro 
mechanically prepare min efields more quickly 
and ease the work of rhe manual deminers 
they support. 
The Light H umanitarian Demining 
Company (HDC(L)) is focused on manual 
demining, which is the only method to dare 
that can clear minefields ro humanitarian 
standards. Although ir focuses on manual 
demining operations, it may assist in prepar-
ing areas for mechanical clearing and EDDT. 
The key here is to retain the skills and experi-
ence of the current manual deminers in rhis 
company. T he light company may also be 
used to perform surveying that is now per-
fo rmed by the regional mine action centers 
and commercial activities. 
Based on mission requirements, 
these companies will be task-organized and 
placed under the control of a Humanitarian 
Demining Ba ttalion (H DBN) command 
ream. The barralion headquarters is a key 
component as it provides the additional heavy 
demining assets required in support of demi-
ning operations in BiH. Our goal is to place 
these more technologically advanced demi-
ning systems d irectly in rhe hands of rhe BiH 
demining u nits, allowing them to complete 
the more diffi cult dem ining tasks. Th is is a 
dynamic step for a demining unit that unril 
now was incapable of hand ling most mechan-
ical demi ning activities. Rather than depend-
ing on commercial companies for rhis equip-
ment, the demining battalion headquarters 
provides this equipment ar key locations 
througho ut BiH when required. Based on 
how rhe HDBN is organized, we calculate a 
demining rare of I 2-24 sq km per year8 can 
be achieved. 
The HDBN will report directly to 
rhe BiH Stand ing Commirree on Military 
Matters (SCMM), which is a state-level quasi-
equ ivalent to rhe U.S . Department of 
Defense. The BHMAC will continue provid-
ing operational direction for the HDBN, but 
it wi ll also be supported with direct 
NATO/EU supervision. T he NATO/EU 
supervision provides rhe required legitimacy 
that will attract sustained IC funding for scare-
of-the-art equipment. 
Commercia l activities have n or 
been eliminated from the process. 
Commercial activities are proficient in con-
ducting technical surveys and will continue to 
provide this service. However, we propose 
reducing commercial demining operations to 
focus fund ing on rhe BiH team. This will 
allow BHMAC ro leverage rhe already austere 
ITF funds ava ilable by focusing commercial 
activities on smaller and less costly demining 
projects. This in turn will provide an increase 
in rhe success rare of the commercial activities. 
To support this change, we are suggesting that 
once rhe BHMAC has contracted for rhe com-
mercial activiry, the demining battalion will 
coordinate the execution of the contract and 
will have oversight of rhc activity. This will 
require moving rhe current Field Operations 
Manager from rhe BHMAC liaison office ro 
rhe HDBN headquarters to ensure commer-
cial acriviries arc coordinated with the AF BiH 
activities. Making use of the latest computer-
ized demining support systems, the HDBN 
will ensure that commercial activities do nor 
"rework" sires, which is seen as the most sig-
nificant issue for commercial activities. 
As we stated earlier, rhe funds and 
diplomatic support for a demining brigade 
cannot be realized. But we arc confid ent that 
if th e proposed demin ing units are successful, 
rhe BiH demining teams will also be able to 
focus on international mandates. W ith over 
60 countries now in need of immediate demi-
ning support, th e need for a humanitarian 
demining brigade in NATO or the EU is 
inevitable. We view our initiative as rhe initial 
step in creating a dem ining unit rhar is capa-
ble of dynamic growth ro meet international 
demining mandates. This global ream has 
added impl ications. One such implication is 
assistance in driving the commercial develop-
ment of demining technologies. As rhe demi-
n ing uni t grows in size, it will generate long-
term marker drivers for enhanced equipment 
and research from the private sector. This in 
turn will help make demining more economi-
cally viable and accelerate an end to the glob-
al demining issue. 
Bottom line 
Based on rhe initial review of costs 
for the unit, it will require $20-23 million to 
implement this plan. Depending on the task 
organization of the HDBN, the estimated 
operational cost will be between $3 million 
and $1 7 million per year and should be total-
ly funded by the BiH government. This will 
require char we hold BiH accountable for th is 
cost through rhe restructured AF BiH budget 
and other BiH government funding. We are 
also srill advocating a strong relationship with 
the ITF to leverage their funds fo r commercial 
activities. If rhese funds are properly managed 
by BiH with assistance from rhe NATO over-
sight team, we are confident that past depend-
ence on uncertain donor funds can be signifi-
cantly reduced if nor eliminated. If something 
is nor done ro significantly reduce BiH d epen-
dence on rhe IC donors, rhe turure of BiH 
demining is uncertain at best. 
continued on p3.ge 53. Rethinking Humanitarian 
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List of the Articles in the Protocol on 
Explosive Remnants of War11 
Preamble 
Article I: General provision and scope of 
application 
Article 2: Definitions 
Article 3: Clearance, removal or destruction 
ofERW 
Article 4: Recording, retaining and transmission 
of information 
Article 5: Other precautions for the protection of 
the civilian population, individual civilians and 
civilian objects from the risks and effects of ERW 
Article 6: Provisions for the protection of 
humanitarian missions and organisations from 
the effects of ERW 
Article 7: Assistance with respect to existing ERW 
Article 8: Cooperation and assistance 
Article 9: Generic preventive measures 
Article I 0: Consultations of high contracting 
parties 
Article Il: Compliance 
Technical Annex: Contains the suggested best 
practice for achieving the objectives contained in 
Articles 4, 5 and 9 of this protocol. High 
contracting parties will implement this technical 
annex on a voluntary basis. 
* Part 1: Recording, storage and 
release of information for UXO and 
abandoned EO 
* Part II: Warnings, MRE, marking, fencing 
and monitoring 
* Part III: Generic preventive measures 
come from the release 
of information. The 
protocol asks the states 
and parties to an 
armed conflict to pro-
vide information, as far 
as practicable, to assist 
mine action. The spe-
cific list of information 
is provided in the tech-
nical annex and 
includes: the targets 
for EO, approximate 
amoums used, the type 
and nature of EO, and 
general locations of 
known and probable 
UXO. Further, provi-
sion is specifically 
made to provide infor-
mation on abandoned 
munitions, including 
rhe location, approxi-
mate numbers and 
types of munitions 
abandoned. Of partic-
ular relevance to clear-
ance and MRE is the 
recommendation that 
information on UXO 
should include meth-
ods o f identification 
and methods for the 
"safe disposal" of EO.? 
Agai n, while the path 
by which information 
is passed is not precise, 
the text of the protocol 
is clear that NGOs are 
included as possible 
recipients of informa-
tion.S 
The key to rhe 
rake a more acti ve role. Recem studies suggest 
that military units are not ideally suited to all 
aspects of mine action, though they do have 
some relevam capabilities. 6 U nder the proto-
col, it could be argued that we will see the mil-
itaty playing an increased role. However, it is 
unlikely that we will see rhe military emering 
mine action in larger numbers than in previ-
ous rimes. T he world's militaries, with limi ted 
resources and a large number of competing 
tasks, will probably continue to welcome rhe 
assistance of mine action organisations. 
Indeed, rhe protocol repeatedly states rhar 
stares can use a third parry to deal with ERW. 
T he second positive impact will 
military-mine action 
community relationship will be rhe imple-
mentation of rhe Protocol V articles. In many 
countries, contingency plann ing for post-con-
flier work is already done jointly by aid organ-
isations and governments. This work now 
needs to be expanded to ensure that military 
forces also rake into account the requirements 
of the protocol on ERW. T hese issues are nor 
something that can be field-tested, but by 
engaging with the political and military actors 
now, NGOs can at least provide evidence of 
rheir experience in these matters, which states 
will hopefully recognise as useful for imple-
menting the protocol on ERW. 
The Fifth Protocol is not perfect. 
Many believe thar the language is roo condi-
tional, and these caveats allow stares ro do lit-
de and yet still legally fu lfil their obligations. 
Many would have liked rhe technical annex to 
be legally binding. Many of the cri ticisms are 
right; from a humanitarian point of view rhe 
p rotocol could have been stronger. However, 
diplomacy such as these negotiations over the 
last three years is rhe art of rhe possible. The 
coordinator of the discussions on ERW, 
Ambassador Chr is Sanders of rhe 
Netherland s, stated in the final session of 
debate that in h is view, the text was the best 
that could be achieved at the timc.9 
Ambassador Sanders is the only person who is 
fu lly aware of the haggling and compromises 
required to ger to the final rext; his judgement 
that the protocol was the best the process 
could produce is probably accurate. 
For proponents of a stronger proto-
col there was some risk to continuing the d is-
cussions. T he alternative to not agreeing in 
November 2003 would have been to p rolong 
the discussions for at least another year, if not 
more. There were many States and NGOs who 
were concerned that furthe r negotiatio ns 
would result in a further weakening of the text. 
The issues had, after all, been exhaustively de-
bared and few could see what new grounds for 
discussion existed. Significanrly, many of the 
srates who agreed w the protocol are nor part 
of the Ottawa Convention, including India, 
Pakistan, Russia, China and the United States. 
Overall, rhe protocol has the agreement of 92 
nations, although the states still have to indi-
vidually sign the protocol.' 0 
If the Fifth Protocol contributes 
anything, it is a requirement rhar rhe states 
now consider the humanitarian impact of 
ERW and they have some guidance on the 
measures rhar can be used to reduce the effects 
in the post-conflict environment. Much will 
depend on how the states will implement the 
protocol. Some of the states have already start-
ed to consider the implications of rhe proto-
col-the United Kingdom used the 2002 
Gulf Conflict to rest some of its ideas for deal-
ing with ERW, such as in formation provision 
to clearance organisations. 
The challenge ahead is to ensure 
that the protocol is implemented in the 
strongest possible manner. While the text of 
rhe protocol carries many caveats, such as 
"where feasible" and "where possible," it is for 
states to d ecide how to incorporate the terms 
of the protocol into their military doctrine. 
The importance of bow the protocol is imple-
mented is perhaps most clearly shown with 
regard to the technical annex. The annex sets 
out clear requirements on the provision of 
information for ordnance used , the obliga-
tions concerning abandoned munitions and to 
whom information is to be given; however, ir 
is all voluntary. The provisions of the tech ni-
cal annex are nor onerous, and it might 
become a measure of a stare's commitment to 
dealing with ERW as to whether or not they 
adop t the technical annex along wirh the for-
mal protocol. 
The mine action community could 
- and should-provide a pivotal role by 
engaging with policy makers wherever possi-
ble ro ensure that states introduce the terms of 
the protocol and the technical an nex into their 
military doctrine. For example, the mine 
action community can provide field experi-
ence to illustrate the importance of informa-
tion provision in reducing the humani tarian 
impact of ERW. For organisations involved in 
mine action, now is the opportunity to try to 
influence how the protocol is implemented. 
Where countries require national legislation to 
enact rhe protocol, political pressure can be 
used to ensure that a state introduces all meas-
ures of the p rotocol and perhaps goes even 
further, for example, by making the provisions 
of the technical annex legally binding. Once 
procedures and laws are written , ir will be 
much more difficult to persuade governments 
to rewrite rhem. H ow stares implement the 
rreary is where the furure success of the proto-
col will be decid ed. 
I. The full title of rhc convention is ''The Convemion 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on rhe Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons \XIhich May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects." 
The framework convention has five prorocols, which ban or 
restrict rhe use o f various types of weapons that are deemed 
to cause unnecessary suffering or affect ei ther sold iers or 
civilians indiscrim inately. The weapons covered include: 
weapons thar leave undetectable fragments in the body 
(Prorocol I); mines, booby-traps and ot·her devices 
(Prorocol II , amended in 1996); incendiary weapons 
(Proroeol Ill); blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV); and 
ERW (Prorocol V). A5 of March 2004, rhere were 92 states 
that were party to the convenrion. 
2. For a history of how the ERW process began and 
was developed, see: "Explosive Remnants of War: The 
Impact of Curren t Negotiations," Paul Ell is1 journal of 
Mine Action. Issue 7 .1 , April 2003; and "' Explosive 
RemnarHS of\XIar: The Negotiations Contin ue," Paul Ellis, 
Journal o[Mi1u Actio11, i>sue 7.2, August 2003. 
3. The definition of EO excludes mines, booby tra ps 
and orher devices as defined in Prorocol I I of rhe CCW. 
While there is rarely a clear disrincrion between rhe location 
of mines and UXO. booby traps and rdued devices could 
nor be included in rhis protocol on ER\V for legal reasons, 
as they already had their own Prmocol (II. amended 1996). 
4. Vicrim assistance does nor have the same promi-
nence in Protocol V as in [he Onawa Convention. The 
issue of how much prominence to give tO vicrim assistance 
was strongly debated. A number of countries, parricubrlr 
South Africa, argued for much !ltronger provision for this 
area. ln the end it was nor possible ro do more rhan include 
ir as a paragraph in Article 8 on Cooperat ion and 
Assistance. 
5. Article 3 of the prowcol on "CIC"arance, Removal or 
Destruction of ER\Xf.'' paragraph 5. states: "High 
Contracting Parries shall cooperate, where appropriate, 
both among themselves and with other states, relevant 
regional and inrcrnarional organisations and non·govern~ 
memaJ organisations on the provision of inter alia tcchn i~ 
cal, financial, material and human resources assistance 
including, in appropriate circumstances, the undertaking of 
joint operations necessary ro fulfil rhe provisions of this 
Art icle ... 
6. See Tbe Role ofth' Military in M i11e Action, GICHD, 
2003. 
7. The rechnical annex has adopted many of the in for~ 
marion requirements thar the rnine action community 
asked for, see the report Explmivt' Rttnnmw of \f'nr-
Jnfonnmion Requiremen/s, G ICHD, 2003. 
8. In Technical Annex l.c.ii, it is stated that: 
"Recipient: The information should be released ro rhe party 
or parties in conrrol of rhe affecred territory and to those 
persons or insti tutions that the releasing Stare is satisfied 
are, or will be, involved in UXO or AXO !abandoned 
explosive ord na nce] clearance in the affected area. in the 
education of rhe civilian population on rhe risks of UXO 
and AXO." 
9 . Paul Ellis' personal norcs from the Meeting of the 
Group of Government Experts to the CC\'7, Geneva, 24 
November 2003. 
I 0. The protocol will come inro fOrce six months after 
the 20th rJ.tification by a srare. 
11. T he full tt:xt of rhe convenrion in rhe six l anguage.~ 
of rhe United Narions can be fo und on rhe GICHD web-
sire at: http://www.gichd.ch/CCW/index.htm or rhe UN 
Departmen t of Disarmament Affai rs websir~: hrtp:// 
disarmamenr2.un.orglccw/index.html, accessed 29 March 
2004 . 
* Photo c/o JCRC. 
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Rethinking Humanitarian Demining Efforts, continued 
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Conclusion 
So where do we go from here? 
Although our focus is to eliminate donor 
funding in rl1c future, we are worki ng with the 
IC and the BHMAC ro generate donor fund-
ing for rhe initial equipment costs. We are 
confident that lC donors will support this ini-
tiative based on rhe much-improved rate of 
return for their investment in this future EU 
member. Over the next few months, the team 
will be working with the SFOR AF BiH 
Restructuring Working Group to integrate 
rh is demining initiative into rhe future of 
BiH. Based on guidance from the OHR, the 
new military structure for BiH is to be imple-
mented in Januaty of 2004. The Defense 
Review Commission is working diligently to 
resolve any legislative or legal roadblocks fo r 
restructuring success. lf we are successful, the 
ream sees this as the beginning of a new era fo r 
coalition military operations. BiH is at a cross-
roads in its history where it may be the best 
suited and most capable country to help coali-
tion countries make this paradigm shift. 
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